dinsdag 23 januari 2018
maandag 22 januari 2018
Nationalisme en verlichting
Voor diegenen geïnteresseerd in de combinatie nationalisme en de
verlichting: Hans Cohn, the Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins
and Background
Klassiek stelt men de Verlichting gelijk aan universalisme, de rede tegenover nationalisme met focus op het lokale, tradities, collectiviteit. Hans Cohn brengt daar zware nuances in aan. Hij zoomt ook in op gespannen relatie tussen bepaalde conservatieven en nationalisme: ' At the same time, nationalism was eschewed by classical conservatism (but not for the reasons that liberals eschewed nationalism). Classical conservatives like Prince Klemens von Metternich of Austria was weary of romantic nationalism because his nation (the Austrian Empire) was multi-ethnic composed of: Czechs, Austrians, Hungarians, Croats, and many, many other notable ethnic groups (Poles, Romanians, Slovaks, etc.). In addition, romantic nationalism threatened the agrarian order from which classical conservatism was premised and built upon—the primary reason why classical conservatism lamented the rise of nationalism."
Ook het klassieke tijdsschema stelt hij in vraag waarbij nationalisme als een louter 19de eeuws fenomeen wordt gezien: " By the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, England had become the first “nation” in the modern sense of the term. Having overcome the bounds of absolutism, and having reached a sense of common peoplehood, modern nationalism had been established. In continental Europe, however, the transition would be defined by strife and a far more consequential, eighteenth century, revolution "
Cohn ziet nationalisme en de Verlichting met elkaar verweven: " in the eighteenth century the free personality emerged in all fields of human activity –political, cultural and economic. But this new order posited the grave problem of how to reconcile the liberty of the individual with the exigencies of social integration, how to subject man to a law which could no longer claim the authority of an absolute lawgiver outside and above men. In this situation nationalism was to become a tie binding the autonomous individual into the partnership of a community.”
Cohn wijst fijntjes op tegenstellingen tussen de conservatieve positie en nationalisme ondermeer door de figuur van JJ Rousseau, vaak veracht door conservatieven maar cruciaal voor nationalisten. In welke mate zien jullie jezelf als conservatieven noodzakelijk ook als nationalist.
Cohn voert Jefferson op als het toonbeeld van de Verlichting die niet tegenstrijdig was met nationalisme. "Jefferson was the “founding father” of American nationalism, which made the United States the only nation to be founded by a true man of the Enlightenment." Zoals hij het stelt: “Thus, over a long life which stretched from the zenith of Voltaire’s influence to that of the Restoration and the Holy Alliance, the American apostle preserved his faith in the Enlightenment and its universal blessings. In the fifty years from July 4, 1776, to Jefferson’s death on July 4, 1826, what had been a promise and intention had become the firm foundation of the American republic.”
Klassiek stelt men de Verlichting gelijk aan universalisme, de rede tegenover nationalisme met focus op het lokale, tradities, collectiviteit. Hans Cohn brengt daar zware nuances in aan. Hij zoomt ook in op gespannen relatie tussen bepaalde conservatieven en nationalisme: ' At the same time, nationalism was eschewed by classical conservatism (but not for the reasons that liberals eschewed nationalism). Classical conservatives like Prince Klemens von Metternich of Austria was weary of romantic nationalism because his nation (the Austrian Empire) was multi-ethnic composed of: Czechs, Austrians, Hungarians, Croats, and many, many other notable ethnic groups (Poles, Romanians, Slovaks, etc.). In addition, romantic nationalism threatened the agrarian order from which classical conservatism was premised and built upon—the primary reason why classical conservatism lamented the rise of nationalism."
Ook het klassieke tijdsschema stelt hij in vraag waarbij nationalisme als een louter 19de eeuws fenomeen wordt gezien: " By the end of the seventeenth century, therefore, England had become the first “nation” in the modern sense of the term. Having overcome the bounds of absolutism, and having reached a sense of common peoplehood, modern nationalism had been established. In continental Europe, however, the transition would be defined by strife and a far more consequential, eighteenth century, revolution "
Cohn ziet nationalisme en de Verlichting met elkaar verweven: " in the eighteenth century the free personality emerged in all fields of human activity –political, cultural and economic. But this new order posited the grave problem of how to reconcile the liberty of the individual with the exigencies of social integration, how to subject man to a law which could no longer claim the authority of an absolute lawgiver outside and above men. In this situation nationalism was to become a tie binding the autonomous individual into the partnership of a community.”
Cohn wijst fijntjes op tegenstellingen tussen de conservatieve positie en nationalisme ondermeer door de figuur van JJ Rousseau, vaak veracht door conservatieven maar cruciaal voor nationalisten. In welke mate zien jullie jezelf als conservatieven noodzakelijk ook als nationalist.
Cohn voert Jefferson op als het toonbeeld van de Verlichting die niet tegenstrijdig was met nationalisme. "Jefferson was the “founding father” of American nationalism, which made the United States the only nation to be founded by a true man of the Enlightenment." Zoals hij het stelt: “Thus, over a long life which stretched from the zenith of Voltaire’s influence to that of the Restoration and the Holy Alliance, the American apostle preserved his faith in the Enlightenment and its universal blessings. In the fifty years from July 4, 1776, to Jefferson’s death on July 4, 1826, what had been a promise and intention had become the firm foundation of the American republic.”
vrijdag 5 januari 2018
Review of Larry Siedentop, The invention of the individual
Over the
last 20 or so years, there has been a revolution in mainstream
philosophy and history--reexamining the relationship between
Christianity and modernity: liberalism, secularism, and democracy, etc.
Larry Siedentop has joined the ranks of Philip S. Gorski (at Yale),
Eric T. Nelson (at Harvard), Charles Taylor (Emeritus Professor at
McGill), and the long deceased, but highly influential and respected,
Talcott Parsons (at Harvard) who have re-asserted a formerly forgotten
widely held belief in the academy--Christianity, regardless of the "God
Question," helped give rise to cherished Western principles and values.
In "Inventing the Individual," Dr. Siedentop examines the notions of
individualism in the early Christian community and historical process.
Primarily looking upon the works of the Apostle Paul, his
epistles--found in the New testament, Saint Augustine and his work City of God (Penguin Classics),
and then Medieval theologians and philosophers, like William of Ockham
and Saint Thomas Aquinas among others, Siedentop highlights how these
Christian works came to found the foundation for Western liberalism,
individualism, and secularism (all good ideas in Siedentop's mind).
Paul's theological egalitarianism, "There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, neither male nor female, for all are one in Christ Jesus," etc. (Gal. 3:28), Augustine's separation of the two worlds (the "two cities": the city of man, and the city of God)--a precursor to secularism, which is not anti-religion, but the separation of matters of the temporal world ("city of man") and possible divine world ("city of God"), Ockham's nominalism (the idea that abstracts exist), and Aquinas's pioneering work in Natural Law all helped slowly build the foundations for liberalism and individualism. Lest we forget that liberal social contract theory, from Hobbes, Locke, Pufendorf, and Grotius, etc. have their foundation, or minimally, some influence, from Natural Law theory which is rooted firmly in the Christian/Catholic tradition. In fact, some conservative critics of liberalism have attempted to pin down liberalism as a modern reincarnation of Medieval Nominalism (cf. Richard Weaver, d. 1963), so again, Siedentop's discussion of Ockham's Nominalism and its influence on the direction of Western understanding of human freedom (pp. 313-319) are incredibly important and insightful, but nothing "new" in the same sense that others have already made these assertions (but in a negative means as opposed to Sidentop's more neutral to celebratory tone). Indeed, even atheist and agnostic scholars and philosophers, not associated with the "New Atheism" of recent fame, have also "rediscovered" Paul's philosophy of individuals and community have begun a "critical" re-examination of Paul and early Christian philosophy through Marxian lenses (cf. John Milbank, Slavoj Zizek, and Creston Davis).
Siedentop's work, most appropriately, can be seen as a scholarship in the field called "political theology." Political Theology is not theocracy, or religious fundamentalism guiding law, but the analysis of how theological principles and ideas have come to influence "secular" institutions. This is where Sidentop's work shines most brightly. He eruditely shows what had been accepted in the Academy long ago, but only recently has been gaining new popularity in the present: religious ideas and principles inexorably influenced Western institutions that we still have today. While Siedentop largely defends modernity as the product, or child, of Christianity, he also offers a cold question for future.
In recent times, the West has been embroiled in a "civil" war between religious conservatives on one side and secular agnostics, atheists, and even anti-institutionalists (mostly referring to being anti-Church and anti-religion) on the other (sometimes better referred to as the "culture wars"). Siedentop argues that this "disturbing" civil war is harming the fabric of Western civilization. Indeed, even learned religious leaders, like Pope Benedict XVI, in saying that his primary mission was the confrontation of secularism, made a huge error in not recognizing the contributions to secularism from Christianity itself (p. 360). This civil war is the product of BOTH sides not really understanding their own history and heritage. As the West is moving into the 21st Century, and with recent conflicts with the Islamic World, the serious question remains whether secular and religious forces in the West will unite to realize its shared heritage, or continue to wage a bitter, destructive, and ultimately needless, if not "disturbing" civil war.
Thus, Siedentop's work is much needed, and hopefully, is not going to be under appreciated by emotivist secularists and Christians who will likely see Siedentop as either "giving cover to Christians" or conversely, "giving cover to secularists." However, one area where Siedentop work falls a bit short, as opposed to Charles Taylor's "A Secular Age" is the brevity of "excessive" footnoted scholarship employed by Dr. Siedentop. While Taylor's A Secular Age is far longer, it is also more extensively footnoted, whereas Siedentop opted for a more accessible and popular style, at the expense of extensive footnoting. Regardless, "Inventing the Individual" is a timely work that is the next wave in modern scholarship finding the roots of Western liberalism.
Paul's theological egalitarianism, "There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, neither male nor female, for all are one in Christ Jesus," etc. (Gal. 3:28), Augustine's separation of the two worlds (the "two cities": the city of man, and the city of God)--a precursor to secularism, which is not anti-religion, but the separation of matters of the temporal world ("city of man") and possible divine world ("city of God"), Ockham's nominalism (the idea that abstracts exist), and Aquinas's pioneering work in Natural Law all helped slowly build the foundations for liberalism and individualism. Lest we forget that liberal social contract theory, from Hobbes, Locke, Pufendorf, and Grotius, etc. have their foundation, or minimally, some influence, from Natural Law theory which is rooted firmly in the Christian/Catholic tradition. In fact, some conservative critics of liberalism have attempted to pin down liberalism as a modern reincarnation of Medieval Nominalism (cf. Richard Weaver, d. 1963), so again, Siedentop's discussion of Ockham's Nominalism and its influence on the direction of Western understanding of human freedom (pp. 313-319) are incredibly important and insightful, but nothing "new" in the same sense that others have already made these assertions (but in a negative means as opposed to Sidentop's more neutral to celebratory tone). Indeed, even atheist and agnostic scholars and philosophers, not associated with the "New Atheism" of recent fame, have also "rediscovered" Paul's philosophy of individuals and community have begun a "critical" re-examination of Paul and early Christian philosophy through Marxian lenses (cf. John Milbank, Slavoj Zizek, and Creston Davis).
Siedentop's work, most appropriately, can be seen as a scholarship in the field called "political theology." Political Theology is not theocracy, or religious fundamentalism guiding law, but the analysis of how theological principles and ideas have come to influence "secular" institutions. This is where Sidentop's work shines most brightly. He eruditely shows what had been accepted in the Academy long ago, but only recently has been gaining new popularity in the present: religious ideas and principles inexorably influenced Western institutions that we still have today. While Siedentop largely defends modernity as the product, or child, of Christianity, he also offers a cold question for future.
In recent times, the West has been embroiled in a "civil" war between religious conservatives on one side and secular agnostics, atheists, and even anti-institutionalists (mostly referring to being anti-Church and anti-religion) on the other (sometimes better referred to as the "culture wars"). Siedentop argues that this "disturbing" civil war is harming the fabric of Western civilization. Indeed, even learned religious leaders, like Pope Benedict XVI, in saying that his primary mission was the confrontation of secularism, made a huge error in not recognizing the contributions to secularism from Christianity itself (p. 360). This civil war is the product of BOTH sides not really understanding their own history and heritage. As the West is moving into the 21st Century, and with recent conflicts with the Islamic World, the serious question remains whether secular and religious forces in the West will unite to realize its shared heritage, or continue to wage a bitter, destructive, and ultimately needless, if not "disturbing" civil war.
Thus, Siedentop's work is much needed, and hopefully, is not going to be under appreciated by emotivist secularists and Christians who will likely see Siedentop as either "giving cover to Christians" or conversely, "giving cover to secularists." However, one area where Siedentop work falls a bit short, as opposed to Charles Taylor's "A Secular Age" is the brevity of "excessive" footnoted scholarship employed by Dr. Siedentop. While Taylor's A Secular Age is far longer, it is also more extensively footnoted, whereas Siedentop opted for a more accessible and popular style, at the expense of extensive footnoting. Regardless, "Inventing the Individual" is a timely work that is the next wave in modern scholarship finding the roots of Western liberalism.
woensdag 3 januari 2018
Review of N. Elias, The Civilizing Process
Norbert
Elais' The Civilizing Process is an explanation of the rise of the
modern nation-state, and the process by which state formation engendered
changes in the psyches and day-to-day manners of modern citizens. In
short, his argument is that the functional complexity of post-medieval
Europe went hand-in-hand with a sublimation of man's baser instincts.
Upon first glance, the reader immediately wonders about the relevance of
findings such as "in medieval society people generally blew their noses
into their hands" (126). The dominant explanations for the rise of the
modern nation-state have usually been based in economics (Marx,
Polanyi, Moore, North & Thomas) and not in the sort of etiquette,
manners and social customs that are the key operating concepts in Elias'
work. However, Elias makes a convincing case that such customs deserve
predominant explanatory weight, being vehicles of social control that
lay the psychological groundwork for the nation-state. Such a finding
helps political scientists answer the persistent question of why Western
political institutions fail when placed into unfamiliar Third-World
social environments. Most analysts have chalked this up to unequal
economic development, but Elias would probably favor an argument
emphasizing the lack of a "civilizing" process in Third-World societies.
Such an explanation--like Putnam's reasoning in revealing Southern
Italy's "civic culture" to be bankrupt--is admittedly open to criticism
of essentialism, cultural determinism, and other postmodern
shortcomings, but at a minimum, it certainly alerts us to pertinent,
non-economic variables at work in the development-democracy
relationship.
Elias selects three comparative cases, France, England and Germany, and performs a content analysis of medieval texts on manners, etiquette, and the transformation of the nobility from warriors into courtiers. These texts are the empirical evidence offered for his key variable, pan-European courtly manners delineated by social structure (classes and "monopolies" of power). The other key variable (it's rather unclear which one is "dependent" on the other) is the rise of the nation-state, which was brought about by an exogenous variable (population growth) as well as two intervening factors: 1) the decline of the nobility relative to national absolutism (both economically and militarily); and 2) the rise of a money economy. Elias shows how centrifugal forces in these societies (mainly the warrior-noble class) resisted the "integration" of absolutism/nationhood, but that these forces in the end were overcome by economics coupled with the centripetal social groundwork of pan-European "civilite" and social customs, leading to an increasingly complex interweaving of social functions. "Society was `in transition' . . . `Simplicity' . . . had been lost. People saw things with more differentiation" (61). "Social control was becoming more binding . . . with the structural transformation of society . . . a change slowly came about: the compulsion to check one's own behaviour" (70).
The near totality of Elias' evidence is qualitative, often selected from medieval writings and secondhand observations. Although he means to proceed inductively from these facts, Elias often reads like a deductive historian, especially when positing lawlike generalizations such as "the more or less sudden emergence of words within languages nearly always points to changes in the lives of people themselves, particularly when the new concepts are destined to become as central and long-lived as these" (48). In fact, his entire thesis can be summarized with another of his apparently deductive axioms: "The growth of units of integration and rule is always at the same time an expression of structural changes in society, that is to say, in human relationships" (254). Marxists, of course, would say that such social changes are themselves dependent upon changes in the relations of production, but Elias gives equal weight to social causes as to economic ones. The economy is by no means neglected in his analysis, since he gives currency, demand for property, and population growth prime explanatory roles in his causal process (despite the fact that there is no quantitative evidence given for these socioeconomic correlations, unlike the analysis of the same topics by North & Thomas). However, Marxists would surely have a fit over Elias' assertion that the civilizing process leads to a wholesale leveling of distinctions between social classes (430), as well as his claim that the modern state arose out of a virtual stalemate between the bourgeois and the nobility (327).
On the topic of state-society relations, Elias makes the provocative argument that for the past 300 years, "monopoly rulers" (including, but not limited to, absolutist kings) are mere functionaries, with the real power resting in the hands of their "subjects" (271). "Control of the centralized institutions themselves is so dispersed that it is difficult to discern clearly who are the rulers and who are the ruled" (315). Of course, under an instable balance of power (including today's Third World) the playing field is presumably up for grabs between different classes and parts of the state, but in a developed society, Elias would argue that the internalization of "civilized" norms means that the "strong" state, while resting on a cohesive social order, is not as autonomous from social forces as one might think.
During the Early Modern Period, Germany was a decentralized power which featured many states. In a learned manner, he instructs the reader on why this had been so as compared to France. However, Elias' most helpful contribution is his contention that the court system had been a means through which knights and nobles developed a super-ego. As the nobles became less powerful in time, the court system also helped the bourgeoisie become more civilized. In time, Elias argued that all classes (upper, middle and lower) became more civilized as more individuals came into contact with the bourgeoisie after migrating to the towns and cities; this process, however, was, of course, an incredibly slow one.
Elias selects three comparative cases, France, England and Germany, and performs a content analysis of medieval texts on manners, etiquette, and the transformation of the nobility from warriors into courtiers. These texts are the empirical evidence offered for his key variable, pan-European courtly manners delineated by social structure (classes and "monopolies" of power). The other key variable (it's rather unclear which one is "dependent" on the other) is the rise of the nation-state, which was brought about by an exogenous variable (population growth) as well as two intervening factors: 1) the decline of the nobility relative to national absolutism (both economically and militarily); and 2) the rise of a money economy. Elias shows how centrifugal forces in these societies (mainly the warrior-noble class) resisted the "integration" of absolutism/nationhood, but that these forces in the end were overcome by economics coupled with the centripetal social groundwork of pan-European "civilite" and social customs, leading to an increasingly complex interweaving of social functions. "Society was `in transition' . . . `Simplicity' . . . had been lost. People saw things with more differentiation" (61). "Social control was becoming more binding . . . with the structural transformation of society . . . a change slowly came about: the compulsion to check one's own behaviour" (70).
The near totality of Elias' evidence is qualitative, often selected from medieval writings and secondhand observations. Although he means to proceed inductively from these facts, Elias often reads like a deductive historian, especially when positing lawlike generalizations such as "the more or less sudden emergence of words within languages nearly always points to changes in the lives of people themselves, particularly when the new concepts are destined to become as central and long-lived as these" (48). In fact, his entire thesis can be summarized with another of his apparently deductive axioms: "The growth of units of integration and rule is always at the same time an expression of structural changes in society, that is to say, in human relationships" (254). Marxists, of course, would say that such social changes are themselves dependent upon changes in the relations of production, but Elias gives equal weight to social causes as to economic ones. The economy is by no means neglected in his analysis, since he gives currency, demand for property, and population growth prime explanatory roles in his causal process (despite the fact that there is no quantitative evidence given for these socioeconomic correlations, unlike the analysis of the same topics by North & Thomas). However, Marxists would surely have a fit over Elias' assertion that the civilizing process leads to a wholesale leveling of distinctions between social classes (430), as well as his claim that the modern state arose out of a virtual stalemate between the bourgeois and the nobility (327).
On the topic of state-society relations, Elias makes the provocative argument that for the past 300 years, "monopoly rulers" (including, but not limited to, absolutist kings) are mere functionaries, with the real power resting in the hands of their "subjects" (271). "Control of the centralized institutions themselves is so dispersed that it is difficult to discern clearly who are the rulers and who are the ruled" (315). Of course, under an instable balance of power (including today's Third World) the playing field is presumably up for grabs between different classes and parts of the state, but in a developed society, Elias would argue that the internalization of "civilized" norms means that the "strong" state, while resting on a cohesive social order, is not as autonomous from social forces as one might think.
During the Early Modern Period, Germany was a decentralized power which featured many states. In a learned manner, he instructs the reader on why this had been so as compared to France. However, Elias' most helpful contribution is his contention that the court system had been a means through which knights and nobles developed a super-ego. As the nobles became less powerful in time, the court system also helped the bourgeoisie become more civilized. In time, Elias argued that all classes (upper, middle and lower) became more civilized as more individuals came into contact with the bourgeoisie after migrating to the towns and cities; this process, however, was, of course, an incredibly slow one.
donderdag 21 december 2017
Zoektocht naar Beagle Snep (#findingthebeagle #findingSNEP)
Kerninformatie
1. Beagle Snep vermist sinds 26/11/2017
Locatie: Kasteel Groenendaal te Hoeilaart (Duboislaan 27)
2. Twee erg waarschijnlijke spottings***:
- vrijdag 1/12 aan Ganzenpootvijver (melding op 3/12)
-dinsdag 5/12 in bos aan Groendaal (melding op 5/12)
3. Minder zekere spotting**:
-maandag 4/12 aan Golf Royal te Tervuren
4. Weinig waarschijnlijke spotting*:
-21/12 aan Kapucijnendreef, grote poort te Tervuren (Engelstalige melding die vond dat gelijkenis met affiche)
- onwaarschijnlijk want : - jogger met beagle (dus bij eigenaar) meermaals gezien
-ondertussen waarschijnlijker dat Snep ofwel binnengenomen is of dood is
5. Erg onwaarschijnlijke spotting: °
-10/12 te Merchtem (net op kruispunt waar gewandeld werd met Snep een maand ervoor)
6. Zo goed als zeker andere beagle:
Prins van Oranjelaan te Ukkel
Wavre
Beersel
Bolta (teruggevonden beagle)
....
Tijdslijn:
zaterdag 9/12
1. Beagle Snep vermist sinds 26/11/2017
Locatie: Kasteel Groenendaal te Hoeilaart (Duboislaan 27)2. Twee erg waarschijnlijke spottings***:
- vrijdag 1/12 aan Ganzenpootvijver (melding op 3/12)
-dinsdag 5/12 in bos aan Groendaal (melding op 5/12)
3. Minder zekere spotting**:
-maandag 4/12 aan Golf Royal te Tervuren
4. Weinig waarschijnlijke spotting*:
-21/12 aan Kapucijnendreef, grote poort te Tervuren (Engelstalige melding die vond dat gelijkenis met affiche)
- onwaarschijnlijk want : - jogger met beagle (dus bij eigenaar) meermaals gezien
-ondertussen waarschijnlijker dat Snep ofwel binnengenomen is of dood is
5. Erg onwaarschijnlijke spotting: °
-10/12 te Merchtem (net op kruispunt waar gewandeld werd met Snep een maand ervoor)
6. Zo goed als zeker andere beagle:
Prins van Oranjelaan te Ukkel
Wavre
Beersel
Bolta (teruggevonden beagle)
....
Tijdslijn:
Zondag 26/11
Beaglewandeling met O, K, I en Snep.
Melding dogid, dogzzz, sites vermist
Nacht: zwaar geregend
Maandag 27/11
10u: fietsen door bos, affiches hangen
regen
Bellen politie uccle, rode,
Dinsdag 28/11
Melding Beersel
Politie, Veeweyde
Woensdag 29/11
Zoektocht huis aan huis Laarheidestraat Beersel
rond gereden in Beersel
Wavre: spotting beagle op parking tussen Gembloux en Wavre
Donderdag 30/11
Ter plaatse
Vrijdag 1/12
Artikel in DM, Radio 2
Zaterdag 2/12
Artikels in HLN, Nieuwsblad
Zondag 3/12
Herhaling wandeling, telefoon over spotting van vrijdag om 16u aan ganzenpootvijver
Beslissing geen spoorhond maar
groep zoektocht
installeren camera's aan kapelletje en parking
Maandag 4/12
Overnachting in tentje aan ganzenpootvijver
Telefoon melding spotting te Tervuren Golf
Dinsdag 5/12
Spotting 15u in bos
Overnachting Tent in bos
woensdag 6/12
opstaan 7u , telefoon voor zoekactie gezien nieuwe spotting
Annulering debat Nassim Taleb
Voormiddag: zoekactie met 5 mensen
Namiddag: zoekactie met 5 anderen + fiets
B. rijdt weg en ziet beagle aan
prins van oranjelaan te Ukkel
Wij rijden met auto door Ukkel
kinderen die flyers bussen : 4
maal beagle gezien; jongen met beagle= papa week ervoor beagle gezien…aan prins van orangjelaan
donderdag 7/12
Melding Spotting te Ukkel = contact met JS die woont te Ukkel: beagle loopt er al enkele jaren (dus niet Snep)=>haal terug van twitter
peter trekt foto andere beagle
vrijdag 8/12
wandelzaterdag 9/12
controleer vp
zondag 10/12
zondag 5 november 2017
Moedige strijd voor gezond geld
Gezond geld?
De Europese Centrale Bank spreekt van een afbouw van de stimulus. Al 2000 miljard euro pompte ze in het systeem en recent besliste ze daar nogmaals 270 miljard euro aan toe te voegen. Terwijl de eerste interventies in de financiële crisis verdedigd konden worden om het instorten van het bankwezen te vermijden, ligt dat ondertussen al 10 jaar achter ons. De interventies nadien dienden vooral ter ondersteuning van Zuid-Europese staten en banken die wellicht beter ordentelijk ontbonden werden in plaats van kunstmatig in leven gehouden.
In mijn boek Roekeloos beschrijf ik hoe de ECB maar niet wil toegeven hoe gevaarlijk haar asymmetrisch beleid is. Het beleid is te soepel tijdens de periode dat de excessen in het economisch systeem worden opgebouwd en nadien wordt de schade voor de deelnemers aan de excessen kunstmatig beperkt. Op die manier creëer je ongewild een neiging om steeds tot nieuwe ontsporingen te komen. We spreken van het zogenaamde moreel risico of moral hazard: als je wel de winsten kunt inpikken die samenhangen met de zeepbel terwijl de schade achteraf in zekere zin verzekerd wordt door de maatschappij, dan zal er maar al te graag een beroep gedaan worden op die verzekering. Medisch onderzoek toont aan dat wanneer een klein deeltje van de hersenen beschadigd wordt (de amygdala), individuen grotere risico’s nemen. Te veel geldcreatie werkt als de verwijdering van de amygdala: een aansporing tot meer risiconame.
Voor het economisch beleid impliceert dat echter logischerwijze dat de centrale bank wel een soort risicomanagement moet toepassen om het opblazen van zeepbellen te verhinderen. Dan helpt het niet dat aan het hoofd van de centrale bank iemand staat die te gemakkelijk beïnvloed wordt door de tijdgeest die alle excessen rationaliseert. Het beleid is systematisch te soepel bij het opbouwen van excessen in het economisch systeem. Bovendien wordt de schade voor deelnemers systematisch kunstmatig beperkt. Door steeds de geldkraan open te draaien als een zeepbel barst maar niets te doen om ze preventief te doorprikken, zaait men systematisch de kiemen voor de volgende crisis.
Fundamenteel is een zeepbel een psychologisch gegeven, en het tijdstip bepalen waarop ze zal barsten, is een hachelijke onderneming. Op een bepaald moment transformeert de marktplaats van aandelen in een piramidespel. Hoewel een aandeel fundamenteel overgewaardeerd is, kan het immers blijven stijgen zolang er achter elke koper een andere staat die het aandeel nog tegen een hogere prijs wil kopen. We zien hier de kuddegeest in werking en gedurende een zekere tijd is die onoverwinnelijk. Hoe groter de zeepbel wordt, hoe minder sceptici er nog overblijven om tegen de stroom in te gaan.
We hebben er goed aan gedaan de brandweer te laten uitrukken, ook al was de brand veroorzaakt door partijen die onverantwoorde risico’s hebben genomen Maar we moeten bij de heropbouw ook brandmuren en brandmelders voorzien. Ondertussen zien we almaar meer tekenen dat heel het economisch systeem verslaafd is geworden aan noodmaatregelen die alleen maar tijdelijk getolereerd mogen worden.
Een vertrouwenscrisis zorgt ervoor dat de kudde collectief haar illiquide investeringen liquide wil maken. Het wordt pas hachelijk als de centrale bank ook steun geeft aan instellingen die niet louter een tijdelijk liquiditeitsprobleem hebben, maar fundamenteel insolvabel zijn geworden. Fundamenteel moeten de monetaire autoriteiten echter goed inzien dat ze vanaf nu hun handen en voeten zullen moeten vuil maken. De doctrine dat we de zeepbel niet kunnen doorprikken, maar achteraf het puin wel zullen opruimen, is onhoudbaar gebleken. Talloze goeroes zeggen dat beleggers riskeren beurswinsten aan zich voorbij te laten gaan als ze nu niet op de trein springen. Fundamenteel baseren ze hun koopadvies voornamelijk op de huidige lage rente. Deze is echter het gevolg van de beleidsreactie na het manifest aflopen van het vorige feestje. We staan dan ook vandaag al voor de test of de centrale bank in staat is krachtige beleidssignalen te geven om het feestje te stoppen, voor het uit de hand loopt. In het recente verleden of het nu ging over ontspoorde bankbalansen of overgewaardeerd vastgoed bleek onze centrale bank helaas niet in staat tegen de wind te leunen.
Je kunt geen fundamentele welvaart creëren door enkel bijdrukken van wat geld. Vroeger was onze geldhoeveelheid gelinkt aan de goudvoorraad van een nationale bank, wat de mogelijkheden beperkte om moeilijke keuzes te omzeilen door de geldpers op te starten. Het risico van fiat geld is echter dat de fundamenten van goed beheer vergeten worden en de geldpers te vlot gehanteerd wordt. Uiteraard kan in een periode waar zich grote schokken voordoen monetair beleid een belangrijke rol spelen, op voorwaarde dat het verantwoord gehanteerd wordt. Maar daar knelt het schoentje net. Leg maar eens uit dat je geen fundamentele welvaart kunt creëren door het bijdrukken van wat geld, als men via de televisie en media vijf jaar lang de boodschap verspreidt dat alles kan worden opgelost als we als consument het geld maar wat meer laten rollen
Moed van weleer
Uiteraard is het een eeuwenoud verschijnsel dat mensen overdrijven in goede jaren. Maar dit betekent wel dat het in slechte jaren extra moeilijk wordt. De inzet van het debat is hoe die kortzichtigheid aan banden gelegd kan worden. Voor het monetair beleid hebben we dit gedaan door de geldcreatie te delegeren aan een onafhankelijke centrale bank. De verleiding om te veel geld te drukken, had al te veel beschavingen ten gronde gericht.
Het is gepast te verwijzen naar de moed van Lucius Lamar die de staat Mississippi vertegenwoordigde in de Amerikaanse Senaat na de Burgeroorlog. Het waren de jaren van de zogenaamde "zilvergekte" waarbij velen pleitten voor het vrij munten van zilver tot munt om zo via inflatie de schulden weg te werken door een golf van "asset price inflation". Ondanks dat Lamar een landbouwstaat vertegenwoordigde uit het Zuiden bleef hij op gevaar voor lijf en leden pleiten voor "gezond geld". Dit vergde niet alleen veel politieke moed maar ook veel overtuigingskracht omdat economische ongeletterdheid de regel was. Bovendien beschouwden velen in het Zuiden het honoreren van de schulden opgelopen in de strijd tegen het Noorden sowieso als verwerpelijk. Toch slaagde hij erin om velen te overtuigen van het belang van gezond geld, ook voor de werkende klasse: "
"But, sir, we come with our convictions unchanged as to the necessity of the laboring classes of this country be- ing protected in all their rights and in all their interests, for when that class sinks, the entire fabric of our society must sink and crumble; but we come believing that they are honest, that they are patient, that they are self-reliant and true to their obliga- tions, and that what it is their duty to do they will feel it is to their interest to do. "
Vandaag hoeven centrale bankiers niet te vrezen voor hun herverkiezing. De vraag die ze zich moeten stellen, is in hoeverre ze vandaag evengoed het algemeen belang dienen door te waken over monetaire stabiliteit als Lucius Lamar dat deed die wel degelijk belangrijke persoonlijke risico's liep.
Ondertussen stemde de gevestigde macht in Mississippi voor instructies aan hun senator Lamar om mee te gaan in de geldcreatie. Lamar antwoordde echter dat hij als Senator de plicht had om zijn geweten te volgen in wat het best was voor de bevolking die hij vertegenwoordigde:
"
Mr, President : Between these resolutions and my convictions there is a great gall I cannot pass it. Of my love to the State of Mississippi I will not speak ; my life alone can tell it My gratitude for all the honor her people have done me no words can ex- press. I am best proving it by doing to-day what I think their true interests and their character require me to do. During my life in that State it has been ray privi- lege to assist in the education of more than one generation of her youth, to have giv- en the impulse to wave afber wave of the young manhood that has passed into the troubled sea of her social and political life. Upon them I have always endeavored to impress the belief that truth was better than falsehood, honesty better than policy, courage better than cowardice. To-day my lessons confront me. To-day I must be true or false, honest or cunning, faithful or unfaithful to my people. Even in this hour of their legislative displeasure and disapprobation I cannot vote as these resolu- tions direct. I cannot and will not shirk the responsibility which my position im- poses. My duty, as I see it, I will do ; and I will vote against this bill.
When that is done my responsibility is ended. My reasons for my vote shall be given to my people. Then it will be for them to determine if adherence to my hon- est convictions has disqualified me from representing them; whether a difference of opinion upon a difficult and complicated subject to which I have given patient, long- continued, conscientious study, to which I have brought entire honesty and singleness of purpose, and upon which I have spent whatever ability God has given me, is now to separate us; whether this difference is to override that complete union of thoogfat, sympathy, and hope which on all other and, as I believe, even more important sub- jects, binds us together. Before them I. must stand or fa11 ; but be their present decis- ion what it may, I know that the time is not far distant when they will recognize my action to^ay as wise and just; and, armed with honest convictions of my duty, I shall calmly await results, believing in the utterances of a great American who never trusted his country in vain, that " truth is omnipotent, and public justice certain." "
PS; Het magazine Harper berichtte aldus over Lamar's "Silver Speech":
Harper's Weekly , February 16: It is a remarkable spectacle, that of Senators Lamar and Hill, on one side, earnestly and eloquently inpisting upon keeping faith and redeeming in their full spirit and in- tention the promise of the government, and, on the other, that of devoted supporters of the Union during the war now insisting that the government shall partially repu- diate its obligations in a way which will necessarily distress industry and labor. . . . If the action of Congress is to be accepted as the test, neither the Republican nor the Democratic party is the party of strict maintenance of the national faith.
PPS: Lamar verdedigde zijn positie om niet de instructies en intuïties te volgen van zijn achterban die voordeel dacht te zien in massieve geldcreatie door te verwijzen naar een episode uit de oorlog:
"; that during the war he was coming over from Europe, and when
near Charleston the captain sent a lad (whose name he never shall forget, Willie Sum- mers) to climb the mast for the purpose of seeing if the port was blockaded ; that Willie, after reachincr the top, replied that he saw twelve ships on the north side of the harbor. The captain said : " Willie, that can*t be so ; they must be on the south side, for on the north side there is a sandbar upon which they will be stranded." Willie replied tliat they are on the north side, and that he saw thirteen now. The captain was a smarter man than Willie. He had as good eyes, but he had sent Willie up there to see, where he would have opportunity to observe; and he was will- ing to abide by his decision.
En zo vervolgde Lamar:
"Thus itis, my countrymen, you have sent me to the topmost mast, and I tell you what I see. If you say I must come down, I will obey withoat a marmur ; but you can't make me lie to yoa ; bat if yoa return me, I will be true to love of country, truth, and God. "
Van al te
rimpelloze beurzen tot overgewaardeerd vastgoed: hebben de enorme
hoeveelheden spotgoedkoop geld die centraal bankiers door de economie
jagen te veel kwalijke neveneffecten? Nationale Bank-gouverneur Jan
Smets wil er niet van weten. Maar helemaal zonder twijfel is hij niet.
Van al te
rimpelloze beurzen tot overgewaardeerd vastgoed: hebben de enorme
hoeveelheden spotgoedkoop geld die centraal bankiers door de economie
jagen te veel kwalijke neveneffecten? Nationale Bank-gouverneur Jan
Smets wil er niet van weten. Maar helemaal zonder twijfel is hij niet.
Van al te
rimpelloze beurzen tot overgewaardeerd vastgoed: hebben de enorme
hoeveelheden spotgoedkoop geld die centraal bankiers door de economie
jagen te veel kwalijke neveneffecten? Nationale Bank-gouverneur Jan
Smets wil er niet van weten. Maar helemaal zonder twijfel is hij niet.
vrijdag 27 oktober 2017
De plicht van een politicus
Zoals in veel domeinen gaat het ook in de
politiek om het vinden van het juiste evenwicht. Het mordicus vasthouden aan
principes zonder enige flexibiliteit of onbereikbare utopieën heeft geen plaats
in de politiek. Het andere extreem is de particratie waarbij het uitsluitend
zou gaan om partijtrouw. Zonder politici die de onafhankelijke koers van hun
geweten durven volgen, kan de bevolking ook alleen maar haar vertrouwen in de
integriteit van de democratie verliezen. Dergelijke onafhankelijke politici
zullen zeldzaam zijn want ze verliezen typisch de steun van collega’s en gemakkelijke
toegang tot financiering noodzakelijk voor hun herverkiezing.
My worthy colleague says, his will ought to be subservient to yours. If that be all, the thing is innocent. If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination; and what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the discussion; in which one set of men deliberate, and another decide; and where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?
To deliver an opinion, is the right of all men; that of constituents is a weighty and respectable opinion, which a representative ought always to rejoice to hear; and which he ought always most seriously to consider. But authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is bound blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though contrary to the clearest conviction of his judgment and conscience,--these are things utterly unknown to the laws of this land, and which arise from a fundamental mistake of the whole order and tenor of our constitution.
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole. You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. If the local constituent should have an interest, or should form an hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real good of the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far, as any other, from any endeavour to give it effect. I beg pardon for saying so much on this subject. I have been unwillingly drawn into it; but I shall ever use a respectful frankness of communication with you. Your faithful friend, your devoted servant, I shall be to the end of my life: a flatterer you do not wish for.”
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